The Disproportionality of the Ferry Losses in the Philippines

Many times the question of if our ferries are safe is asked. This is especially true when a ferry has an accident or is lost especially when the casualty count is high. Rather than answering the question straight, if I am asked, I might answer it “it depends” because that is probably the most exact answer to the question anyway but then many will be puzzled by that answer (pilosopo ba?). Read on and you will be enlightened further and maybe your views about the safety our ferries might change.

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Even if a car is new it doesn’t mean it won’t take a dip into the water. Same principle applies with ships. Photo by Zed Garett (happened just today — what a timely photo for my article). Thanks a lot to the photo owner.

But first a clarification. I am purposely limiting this topic to ferries because tackling all the ship types at once will be very heavy and tedious as we have more freighters than ferries and add to that the other types like the tugs, tankers, etc. The ferry losses is the segment that actually raises the hackles of the people of the country who are mainly uneducated on the topic of maritime losses. This relative ignorance is further fanned by our also-uneducated media whose writers and editors cannot even seem to get the ferries’ names right (it seems they are too lazy to verify with MARINA, the maritime authority). Of course, it is well-known that our media is on the sensationalistic side and so oftentimes accuracy, objectivity and balance are lost with that (do these sell anyway?).

Another limitation I also pose here is I won’t include our wooden-hulled passenger crafts in the discussion. Those crafts are really flimsy especially those equipped with outriggers, the motor bancas. This ship type (those are ships because any sea craft having a passenger capacity of 12 is not a boat) lacks the basic safety equipment that even without a storm they can sink like when an outrigger breaks or when the hull develops a leak big enough that water can’t be bailed fast enough. But I would rather not comment on their seamanship or lack of formal maritime education because in my decades of traveling at sea I found that many of them are actually very good in reading the wind and the waves, a nautical skill that is not taught in maritime schools anymore. Also excluded in the discussion are the wooden-hulled lanchas and batels which were formerly called as motor boats which are not called as motor launches.

My topic here is about the disproportionality (or lack of proportionality) of our maritime losses to clarify that our ferry losses are not proportional with regards to the area and to the ship type (the implication is not all sink). Like what I just mentioned earlier, our wooden-hulled crafts especially the motor bancas are prone to losses especially in areas notorious for its dangerous waves like in Surigao. But these sea crafts continue to exist because in many cases these are the most practical crafts for certain routes like the routes to our small islands and islets or the coastal barrios that have no roads (or if taking the roundabout road will take too long). Motor bancas can land even on bare shores which the other crafts can’t do and moreover these can operate profitably on the barest minimum of passengers and cargo something which is impossible in steel-hulled vessels which have engines that are much, much bigger and are heavier.

The liners, our multi-day ships, among our class of ferries are also very vulnerable to losses (a surprise?) and much more than others classes pro rata to their small number. Relative to their small number, we have lost a lot of liners in the past for a variety of reasons – capsizing, foundering, beaching, wrecking, collision, fire, bombing and explosion. And this might come as a surprise to many because in the main it is our liners that are the biggest, these hold the highest of the certificates (and in insurance many have the comprehensive P & I or “Protection and Indemnity”), these have our most experienced and best crewmen supposedly (unlike in smaller ferries where a Second Mate can serve as Captain of the ship) and much pride of its shipping company is riding on them (well, not all, as we had liners that were no more than the average overnight ferry).

But this vulnerability is actually completely true. We lost the SuperFerry 3 (fire in a shipyard in 2000), SuperFerry 6 (fire while sailing in 2000 too), the SuperFerry 7 (fire in port in 1997), SuperFerry 9 (capsizing in 2009), the SuperFerry 14 (firebombing in 2000 but the official report says otherwise). A total of five SuperFerries when only a total of 20 ships ever carried the name “SuperFerry” (it seems it is not a good name?). The St. Thomas Aquinas, the former SuperFerry 2 was lost in a collision in 2013 and the St. Gregory The Great, the former SuperFerry 20 was also lost (taking a shortcut and hitting the reefs and she was no longer repaired and just sold after equipment was taken out). These two ferries were already under 2GO when they were lost. Not included here were the groundings of the Dona Virginia and the Our Lady of Banneux (technically under Cebu Ferries Corporation then but an actual liner) from which they were never repaired and ending their sailing careers).

Sulpicio Lines is much-lambasted and derided by most of our people but actually they have less losses from their “Princess” and “Don/Dona” series of ships in the comparative period as the existence of the “SuperFerries” of WG&A (William, Gothong & Aboitiz and its successor company Aboitiz Transport System (ATS). However, it is true that in passenger casualties the total of Sulpicio Lines is much, much higher because they have the tendency to sail straight into storms like the revered Compania Maritima before them (in terms of ship losses and not in casualties) and that historical company took a lot of losses from those risk-takings too (and more than even Sulpicio Lines).

From 1996 when the WG&A was formed, Sulpicio Lines only lost the Philippine Princess (fire while under refitting in 1997), the Princess of the Orient (capsizing in a storm in 1998), the Iloilo Princess (fire and capsizing while under refitting in 2003), the Princess of the World (fire while sailing in 2005) and the Princess of the Stars (capsizing in a storm in 2008) and the Princess of the Pacific (serious grounding incident resulting in complete total loss in 2004). That is until they were suspended in 2008 when only one liner was left sailing for them, the Princess of the South which did not sink.

In the comparative period, WG&A and ATS employed a total of 24 liners (the overnight ferries of Cebu Ferries Corporation was obviously not included here are they are not multiday liners). Sulpicio Lines had a total of 22 liners in the parallel period so their numbers are about even. But the ship loss total of WG&A, ATS and 2GO is clearly higher and the public was never made aware of this. Maybe some good PR works while it seems Sulpicio Lines never took care of that and all they knew was feeding their passengers well (unli rice or smorgasbord, anyone?). But then however those liner losses are scandalous in number, by whatever measure. Imagine losing more than one liner per year on the average.

Some of the liners of WG&A and ATS were not SuperFerries in name but but the Our Ladies, the two Cities and a Dona from William Lines had perfect safety records as none of them was ever lost. Now, does the choice of name matter in safety? Or the “lesser” ferries do try harder and are more careful? That discrepancy certainly made me think and it might be worth a study.

Negros Navigation was far safer than the WG&A and Sulpicio Lines losing only the St. Francis Xavier in 1999. Do naming of liners after saints enhance their safety? Conversely, do naming of liners with the qualifier “Super” means the ship will sink faster? Questions, questions. But the lightly-regarded and revived Carlos A. Gothong Lines Incorporated (CAGLI) tops them all with absolutely no losses. Now for a company that sometimes have difficulty painting their ships that is something (while the spic-and-span WG&A and ATS which repaints their liners while sailing tops the losses department). Does it mean it is better not to repaint liners well? I observed in the eastern seaboard that the ships that are not painted well have no losses (until the dumb Archipelago Ferries let its stalled Maharlika II sank into the waves in 2014 without rescuing it and thereby breaking the record – that ship was newly painted when it went under so the repainting might have doomed her?). Well, in my earlier thesis and later in this article I find it funny that the ships which are more rusty does not sink as long as it is not a Batangas ship (ah, the disproportionality again). While those that can always afford new paint like WG&A and successor ATS sink. Is a new coat of paint a sign of danger for the ship? Or is it the P & I insurance that did them in? Funny, funny. Negros Navigation when it was already in trouble and lacks the money already did not have one ship sinking. So the illiquidity which Negros Navigation suffered means more safety? Har, har! Whatever, I want to commend them and top honcho Sulficio Tagud for taking the high road and not just let the ships sink just to collect insurance. And last note, in multi-day liner operations before, Aleson Shipping Lines never lost a ship.

Liners sink at a faster rate pro rata compared to overnight ferries (if the wooden-hulled ferries of the past are not counted) and that is a big puzzle to me. And of course nobody will know for sure because nobody studied that as we don’t have the equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the USA which call in true experts and go in depth why the transportation accidents happened. Is it because while on a voyage the liners are practically running 24 hours a days and systems, equipment and personnel are stressed more? Is it because the ships reach their reliability/cycles earlier in terms of hours of usage like the electrical lines which is a cause of fire? Or are their crew simply more tired and believes that their ships with high certifications are less vulnerable to sinking (as if those certificates will keep the ship afloat)?

In the earlier decades and even recently it is known that liners take more chances with storms and maybe because they think they can battle the waves better because they are bigger. There are shipping companies who were known to be more brave (or foolhardy?) in sailing ships when there are storms about and among them the old Compania Maritima and Sulpicio Lines almost surely top the list. Now, however, the field is more level as all Philippine ships are barred from sailing when the center wind of the storm reaches 60kph. And for the smaller ships less than 250gt they are not permitted to sail when the center wind is already 45kph or when the local weather agency PAGASA declares a “gale warning” even though there is no a gale. When the suspensions are in effect better just watch the foreign ships still continue sailing for they are not covered by the suspension and most actually use INMARSAT or equivalent which is just a curiosity in the local maritime world until now when that is already well-established outside of the Philippines (the lousy PAGASA which can’t do localized forecasts seems to be already good for them since it is free while they have to pay for INMARSAT).

Liners also sink faster than short-distance ferries whose sailing durations are all short and whose crews probably know their particular seas and routes more. When to think most short-distance ferries which are always small are captained in the main by Second or Third Mates and whose engine department are headed by Second or sometimes by just Marine Diesel Mechanics who have not even finished college but passed an exam just the same (well, competence in running and maintaining a machine well is not necessarily dictated by diplomas, trust me). Even though liners might be using ECDIS don’t be too sure they will reach their destination better than the lowly short-distance ferry using just what is called as dead reckoning. In truth, ECDIS or whatever better bridge equipment does not guarantee better seamanship or navigation. After all it will not show the wind and wave which only something like INMARSAT can.

So in liners disproportionality already exist. And their international certifications don’t even save them from disasters. So, I advise those who take liners, don’t be very sure and make the necessary precautions like memorizing the different alarms and making sure where your life vests are. And don’t jump to the water too early. Liners are tall and that plunge could hurt you. And when in the water at night tie yourselves together so as not to drift (a whistle is a big help in calling attention if you are drifting). Note the water can be cold at night and hypothermia can set in. Take a selfie too before jumping and upload it. Who knows if it will be your last photo. Your loved ones will sure prize it. Ah, don’t take all I said in this paragraph too seriously.

In overnight ferries there seems to be disproportionality with regards to companies and not to home port (if analyzed pro rata to the size of the fleet which means the size of the fleets are taken into consideration) and to the routes. Well, for practical purposes there are only a few home ports for overnight ferries – Cebu, Zamboanga, Batangas, Manila, Lucena and Iloilo, in that order maybe in terms of sailings (a clarification, there are overnight ships originating from say northern Mindanao but all of those ferries are actually based in Cebu). Analyzing, some overnight ferry companies deserve the Gold Award while some should be suspended from service, maybe.

It must be noted that one of the biggest overnight ferries two decades ago and which dominated the Visayas-Mindanao waters for nearly a decade, the Cebu Ferries Corporation (CFC), a subsidiary of WG&A and successor Aboitiz Transport System (ATS) did not lose a single ship ever until it they left Cebu for Batangas and became the “Batangas Ferries” and even there their perfect streak continued. Maybe some of their people need to be recruited by other companies or sent there by MARINA to share the experience. They can lecture on the topic, “On How Not To Sink”. Maybe it is not just with the choice of name that they were safe? Or was it in the livery? The only problem it seems is they did not send their Captains to their liners like the St. Thomas Aquinas who made a dumb mistake trying to test the hardness of the ice-classed bow of the Sulpicio Express Siete.

In the Cebu-based regional shipping companies which are operators of overnight ferries it is probably Lite Ferries who is the Valedictorian having lost no ships even though their fleet is already big. Maybe that will come as a surprise to many but whatever they deserve a big round of applause. Another company whose Captains might need to be recruited by other shipping companies or pry open their secret if there is any. Are they better readers of SOLAS? One thing I am sure though is its owner does not belong to the same fraternity as one former Batangas shipping company owner who threatens mayhem if his ship sinks.

There are other overnight ferry companies in Cebu that could have shared First Honors with Lite Ferries but in a tie-breaker Lite Ferries wins because they have the most ships and not by a small margin at that. Others with perfect records are the defunct Palacio Lines (well, some might argue that that is a Samar shipping company but I digress). Now I can’t understand why an overnight ferry company with a perfect safety record will go under as a company. Seems something is not right. Aside from Palacio Lines there are a lot of there Cebu-based overnight ferry companies that have perfect safety records in terms of having no ship losses. Some of these are still extant and sailing and some have already quit the business (it’s a waste, isn’t it, for them to just go away like that).

Among these is the legendary Gabisan Shipping Lines, VG Shipping, Kinswell Shipping, Roly Shipping, Jadestar Shipping, South Pacific Transport and many other smaller shipping lines with just one or two ships (most of these are already gone now but still their perfect records remain). I just don’t know why they can’t catch a break from MARINA as in they are not given special citations and handed more privileges in sailing because after all they have proven they know their stuff in shipping. But no, when MARINA goes headhunting in safety they are lambasted in the same vein as those which had sunk ships as if they are just as guilty. Actually, to set the record straight about half of the overnight ferry companies in the whole Philippines never had any ship losses. This is true even in Zamboanga where Magnolia Shipping Lines, Ever Lines and a lot of other operators with just one or two steel-hulled ferries have perfect safety records. Now, can’t MARINA even for once credit them properly and publish their names because the way I feel at times with media reports and with MARINA statements it is as if all our shipping companies already had sunk ships which is simply not the case. In the liner sector that is true but in the overnight ferry and short-distance sector, combined, most shipping companies never had any ship losses. Don’t they deserve credit and more respect and recognition? But no, they are sunk not beneath the waves but in obscurity and that is one of the purpose of this article, to set the record straight.

In Manila, the old MBRS Lines and its successor Romblon Shipping Line never lost a ship (but the company is dead now anyway, sunk by the intermodal). In Lucena, Kalayaan Shipping Lines might have a perfect safety record too at least in steel-hulled ferries. In Batangas, there are operators of just one or two ferries which have not lost a ship (do they take care not to lose one because that will mean the shutdown of operations?). In Iloilo, did Milagrosa Shipping Lines already lost a ship? In number half of the overnight ferry operators never lost a ship although in the number of ships owned theirs comprise just the minority, to clarify.

It is in short-distance ferries that I noticed a lot more of disproportionalities especially in the recent decades when maritime databases were able to keep track with them (the wooden-hulled short-distance ferries generally doesn’t have IMO Numbers so keeping track of them is difficult but these lanchas or batels were our early short-distance ferries aside from the motor bancas). For this sector or segment I would rather stick to steel-hulled ferries like what I mentioned early on especially since there is no way to track the hundreds and hundreds of motor bancas and their losses which are not even properly reported at times.

There are areas, routes and short-distance companies that have perfect safety records (again, wooden hulled ferries are not included here and that also mean the earlier years). In the eastern seaboard where the typhoons first strike and where it is fiercest the routes and shipping companies there have a perfect safety record ever since the steel-hulled ships first appeared in 1979. This was only broken in 2013 due to the dumbness of a stranger which invaded the Masbate waters (is that part of the eastern seaboard anyway? but Masbate is in Bicol). They withdrew from Bicol after that incident to just sail the more benign Camotes Sea waters. And that is one of the reasons why I was furious at Archipelago Ferries for not coming to the aid of their stalled ship for 6 hours when their good ship was just just two hours sailing away and so the stricken ship slid off the waves (shouldn’t someone be hanged for that?). Because of that the perfect record of the local shipping companies based in the eastern seaboard was broken. I just hope the crewmen of Maharlika Cuatro which failed to respond to an SOS then are not employed in the FastCats now.

Short-distance ferries also does not sink in the Tablas Sea crossings or in the routes to Marinduque from Lucena. However, I do not know what is the curse of the Verde Island Passage that many ships have been already lost there when to think practically the same shipping companies ply the three routes mentioned. To think the Tablas Sea wind and waves could be rougher than that in Verde Island Passage. Did they assign their lousier crews there? Just asking. As they say the proof is in the pudding (and the pudding tastes bad).

I just wonder too about the luck of the Mindanao Sea crossings. The waves there could also be rough and the crossing is longer but none was ever lost among the short-distance ferries running the Dumaguete-Dapitan, Samboan-Dapitan and Jagna-Balingoan routes. Like in Tablas Strait, do the longer route makes the crews more careful? Are the crews there better trained and has better seamanship?

The many routes connecting Cebu island and Negros island and Negros island and Panay island are also safe. Hard to find there a short-distance steel-hulled ferry that sank. That is also true for the steel-hulled ferries connecting Masbate island to Cebu island when the distance there is also long for a short-distance ferry and the wind and waves are no less dangerous. What is their secret there? Is it just that Camotes Sea navigators are lousier? With exceptions, of course because Gabisan Shipping surely will not agree.

I could go to the less obscure, short-distance routes. Just the same I will tell you these are also safe. Never heard of a steel ferry going to Alabat that sank. Or to Dinagat and Siargao islands (sure their motor bancas sink). Or the routes to Basilan from Zamboanga. Not even a RORO to Guimaras have sunk or a RORO to Bantayan island. That is also true for the short-distance connections within Romblon island served by steel-hulled ships (the Princess Camille that capsized in Romblon port in 2003 was an overnight ferry from Batangas). No steel-hulled ferry connecting Leyte and Bohol was ever lost too. And that is also true for the route connecting Siquijor to Dumaguete.

So a lot of our short-distance routes and the ferries plying them are actually safe. Who can argue against a perfect safety record? A little rust will not sink ships nor would a non-functioning firefighting pump (and the ship is not in the middle of an ocean anyway). Those are just a little margins that are not that critical. Does not look good to the eye but to a passenger like me it is more important if MARINA enforces their Memorandum Circular that ferries should feed its passengers if the arrival of the ship exceeds 7am. And I am more concerned if the ship is clean especially the rest rooms and if there is clean drinking water. Besides, trust me, our mariners are not that negligent or dumb that they will leave the ramps unclosed and then sail like what some Europeans did.

So are our ferries safe? Yes, it is except for the liners, some shipping companies and some routes and areas. Never mind if they are old. It is not necessarily the factor that will sink ships (a ship if it loses motive power still has the flotation of a barge). It is actually the lack of seamanship that sinks ships (old ship, new ship can both collide or fail to heed the weather). And trust the short-distance ferries on the fringes and don’t underestimate them. The crew won’t let their ships sink if their families, relatives, friends, schoolmates, etc. are aboard. Well, not all. Be a little wary in Verde Island Passage and in Camotes Sea.

Let us be more objective. Our ferries and mariners are not really that bad, contrary to what hecklers say.

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The Result of the Losses of the MV Leyte, MV Guimaras and MV Dadiangas and the Scrapping of the MV Mindanao of Compania Maritima

Nowadays, those four liners of the defunct but once great Compania Maritima will no longer ring a bell to most people. Even in the years when the four were still sailing those were not among the best or the primary liners of the said shipping line except for the MV Mindanao which was actually the second ship to carry that name in Compania Maritima. And so what was the significance then of their losses? This I will try to explain.

The shipping company Compania Maritima of the Philippines (as there were other shipping companies of that name abroad and even in Spain, the country of origin of our Compania Maritima) was the biggest in local passenger shipping from probably  the late Spanish era and until just before the company folded sometime in 1984 at the peak of the political and economic crisis besetting the country then. And so, the company had a run at the top of our passenger shipping field for nearly a century and that is probably a record that can no longer be broken. Compania Maritima in English means “Maritime Company”.

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The logo of Compania Maritima (Credits to Lindsay Bridge)

When the Pacific War ended and the shipping companies were still struggling to get back on its feet they were dependent on the war surplus ships that were being handed down by the Americans. Although Compania Maritima was also a recipient of these kind of ships their rise was not dependent on it as they were capable of acquiring surplus ships from Europe using their Spanish connections (the owners of the company, the Fernandez Hermanos were dual Filipino and Spanish citizens). Their contemporaries Madrigal Shipping and Manila Steamship (the Elizalde shipping company) were also capable of that (now who remembers those two shipping companies?) but their acquisitions were old ships that I suspect were castoffs from convoy duty during the war. In comparison, Compania Maritima’s ships from Europe were just a few years old.

Right off the bat, Compania Maritima had the biggest passenger fleet in local shipping after the war and their best ships were the biggest ferries in the Liberation and post-Liberation years. Aside from their war-surplus ex-”C1-M-AV1” ships which were refrigerated cargo ships during the war, Compania Maritima had ships whose origins were as liners in Europe and it definitely has a difference over passenger ships whose origins were as cargo ships. Among the ships from Europe was their first flagship, the MV Cebu and the sister ships MV Panay and MV Jolo. The latter two were fast cruiser ships of that early Republic shipping years.

Locally, it was almost always that Compania Maritima will have the best and biggest ships and the biggest fleet. They were also among the first to order brand-new liners like the MV Luzon in 1959, the MV Visayas in 1963 and the MV Filipinas in 1968. When the three were fielded those ships were not only the biggest but also the best (as compared to the ex-”C1-M-AV1” and the ex-”C1A” types which were big but not really that luxurious). Not included in this comparison were liners whose main function were as oceangoing liners. Among these are the brand-new ships of De la Rama Steamship which were leased from the government that later will become the subject of a dispute in court.

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Credits to Philippine Herald and Gorio Belen

A ship bigger than the three mentioned was the MV Mindanao of the company which came in 1970 from Europe but was not a brand-new ship having been built in 1959. But her distinction when she was fielded was she was the biggest liner sailing then and even bigger than the flagship MV Filipinas. It was only in December 1979 when her record length will be broken when the MV Dona Virginia came to William Lines.

The MV Mindanao was the last-ever passenger-cargo ship acquired by Compania Maritima and the 1970’s was the decade when they will lose a lot of ships as casualties of typhoons. Some will sink, some will capsize and some will be wrecked. Now those three categories are all different in the determination of the loss of a ship. Not all ship losses actually result in the disappearance of the ship below water. In “wrecking” the ship will still be above water in some beach. In “capsizing”, there are many cases when part of the ship can still be above water or just below the waterline, visible and accessible. But many times also the ship will be in deep waters and so that is called “capsizing and sinking”. If the hull is holed or broke into two it will simply be “sinking”.

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Credits to Gorio Belen

The MV Leyte was a small passenger-cargo ship, technically a multi-day liner but by no means a luxury liner as she was just a former “FS” cargo ship during the war which was converted for passenger-cargo use. As a passenger-cargo ship, her career evolved mainly in serving her namesake island and province through the port of Tacloban in a route extending up to Butuan and Nasipit. There are times though when she also substituted in other routes outside Leyte. The ship was originally known as USS FS-386 in the US Army.

This small ship came to Compania Maritima in 1947. Although 53.9 meters in length over-all and 560 gross register tons this ship was lengthened to 66.2 meters with a gross register tonnage of 730 tons. Lengthening of ex-”FS” ships was common then (most were actually lengthened) in order to increase their passenger and cargo capacities. The speed of this type of ship was between 10 and 11 knots and their accommodations were rather spartan.

1965 0201 MV Guimaras

Credits to Philippine Herald and Gorio Belen

The MV Guimaras was not a small liner for her time with a length over-all of 98.6 meters, a gross register tonnage of 3,555 tons and a net register of 1,868 tons. Translated to more modern measurements that is approximately the dimensions of the fast cruiser liners of William Lines of the 1970’s. She actually had the dimensions of the sank MV Cebu City and MV Don Juan which were both flagships but her breadth was one meter wider. It is hard to compare her with the ROPAXes of today as this type have greater beams than the cruiser ships of old and these are generally taller. The “fatter” MV Don Claudio is actually a nearer match but still the breadth of the MV Guimaras was bigger. The MV Guimaras was actually bigger than the flagships of the other shipping companies of her era.

The MV Guimaras was one of the former liners from Europe that came here in the 1960’s to bolster our fleets when surplus ships from the war were no longer available in the market. It was not only Compania Maritima which took this route but also Carlos A. Gothong & Company (the yet-undivided company), William Lines and Sweet Lines. These ferries from Europe actually averaged 100 meters in length over-all and that will give an approximate idea of their size (gross register tonnage is sometimes a subjective measure). On the average their speed was about 15 knots but the speed of the MV Guimaras tops that at 16.5 knots.

The MV Guimaras was the former refrigerated cargo ship Sidi-Aich of the Societe Generale des Transports Maritimes a Vapeur (SGTM) of Marseilles, France and she was completed in 1957 and so when she came she was not yet an old ship. The route of the MV Guimaras from the time she was fielded until she lost was the Manila-Iloilo-Cotabato route although at times she also dropped anchor too in Zamboanga port which was just on the way.

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The Kitala (Credits to Jean Pierre Le Fustec)

The MV Dadiangas was a bigger ship than the MV Guimaras but built in the same year and also in France where she was known as the Kitala of the Compagnie Maritime des Chargeurs Reunis. Like the MV Guimaras she was also a refrigerated cargo ship with passengers and the advantage of this type is air-conditioning and refrigeration is available from the start and so they can be refitted as luxury liners.

This ship was 109.5 meters in length over-all with a gross register tonnage, the cubic volume of 4,143 tons and a net register tonnage of 3,240 tons. For comparison, this ship is already the size of the MV Dipolog Princess and MV Iloilo Princess, both of which reached the new millennium. She came to Compania Maritima in 1969 and her first name in the company was MV Isla Verde. She was subsequently renamed to MV Dadiangas in 1976.

Like the biggest ships of Compania Maritima, the MV Isla Verde also spent part of her career on overseas routes. When she was sailing the local seas her route was to Dadiangas (a.k.a. General Santos City) and Davao. In the later part of her career she was paired with the MV Leyte Gulf of the company in the same route. She is also a relatively fast ship for her time at 16 knots.

A summer Signal No. 3 typhoon of 150-kph center wind strength, the Typhoon “Atang” caught the MV Leyte on a voyage from Manila and she was wrecked in the southwestern portion of Sibuyan island trying to reach shelter, the usual predicament then of ships without radars during the storms of those times. The MV Leyte was almost on a collision course with the oncoming typhoon and so she actually preceded the fate of the MV Princess of the Stars in almost the same area 30 years later. The ship met her sad fate on April 20, 1978.

Meanwhile, the MV Guimaras was caught by the twin storms Typhoon “Etang” and Typhoon “Gening” which intensified the habagat waves and created a storm surge. The MV Guimaras was driven ashore on July 7, 1979 a kilometer south of Turtle Island in Campomanes Bay in Sipalay, Negros Occidental. She could have been trying to reach port as Sipalay has a port or she might have been trying to seek shelter in the bay. And on July 18 of that same year she was officially abandoned. The wreck of MV Guimaras is still there today in shallow waters of about 20 feet and is already a dive site. According to a website, the wreck of the MV Guimaras is already broken now.

In studying maritime losses one lesson that can be gained is it is not a good idea to try to outrun a typhoon or even a tropical storm (the modern terminology if the center wind is below 120kph). This is what MV Dadiangas tried to do when she passed the eastern seaboard of Mindanao on the way back to Manila from Davao. A tropical storm, the Typhoon “Huaning” was also on its way to Surigao and Leyte but was still then at some distance and still weak. But sea disturbance is not confined to within the walls of the typhoon and so the MV Dadiangas ran aground and was wrecked in Siargao island and to think the maximum strength of the typhoon as it was called then was only 95kph. MV Dadiangas was wrecked on June 23, 1980 and was broken up in 1981.

Three lost ships that at first look do not have that much significance. But then the big MV Mindanao of the company was also broken up in 1980. What does it matter here now in the annals of Philippine passenger shipping?

In the closing years of the 1970’s especially in 1978, Compania Maritima, William Lines and Sulpicio Lines were already at near-parity with each other in fleet size and quality especially after the slew of purchases of fast cruisers liners of William Lines and Sulpicio Lines. Meanwhile, Compania Maritima was no longer buying ferries after 1970 and in the 1970’s the company had a lot of ship losses. That means a net decrease for their passenger-cargo fleet while the passenger fleets of her main competitors were getting bigger.

It has long been my wonder if Compania Maritima was ever overtaken as the local Number 1 before their demise. Upon further peering it seems with the consecutive losses of the MV Leyte, MV Guimaras and MV Dadiangas and the scrapping of the MV Mindanao was the tipping point in the relative parity of the three companies. After that the two Chinoy shipping companies were already ahead by a little. The acquisition of William Lines of their new flagship MV Dona Virginia in December 1979 and of the MV Philippine Princess by Sulpicio Lines in 1981 plus their good salvage job on the burned MV Don Sulpicio which became the MV Dona Paz in 1981 were the final additions that pushed William Lines and Sulpicio Lines clearly ahead of Compania Maritima and that was epoch-making as the run on the top of Compania Maritima after nearly a century was finally broken. And to think Sulpicio Lines also lost their MV Dona Paulina in a wrecking in Canigao Island on May 21, 1980 and their old MV Don Manuel had a non-fatal collision on the same year.

By 1981 Compania Maritima only had 3 original liners (the MV Filipinas, MV Luzon and MV Visayas) plus one former refrigerated cargo ship from Europe (the MV Leyte Gulf) and one former ”C1-M-AV1” ship (the MV Samar) plus a few ex-”FS” ships that were not all in passenger service. By that year, William Lines had 6 fast cruiser liners already (the MV Cebu City, MV Misamis Occidental, MV Manila City, MV Cagayan de Oro City, MV Ozamis City and the MV Tacloban City) plus a former refrigerated ship from Europe (the MV Davao City) and 10 ex-”FS” ships in liner and overnight routes. Meanwhile, Sulpicio Lines had 5 fast cruiser liners already (the MV Philippine Princess, MV Don Enrique, Don MV Don Eusebio, MV Dona Paz and MV Dona Marilyn) plus 2 former refrigerated cargo ships from Europe (the MV Dona Angelina and MV Dona Helene), 4 other ships from Europe (the MV Dona Vicenta, MV Don Camilo, MV Dona Gloria and the MV Dona Julieta), the Don Ricardo and MV Don Carlos which were from Japan, the ex-”FS” ships Don Victoriano I and the MV Don Alfredo, the MV Dona Lily from Australia which was the size of an “FS” ship plus the local builds MV Ethel and MV Jeanette. On the balance, in 1981 Sulpicio Lines might already have a very slight pull over William Lines which was a very great comeback from the split of Carlos A. Gothong & Co. in 1972.

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The remains of Compania Maritima in Cebu

To repeat, even without the MV Dona Virginia and the MV Philippine Princess, the two Chinoy shipping lines were already ahead of Compania Maritima. And if the Compania Maritima, William Lines and Sulpicio Lines had rough parity in 1978 what probably tipped the balance were the three lost ships of Compania Maritima and the breaking-up of MV Mindanao in 1980. Four lost liners without replacements. And that is the problem of losing ships and not buying replacements.

From 1981 it was no longer just a matter of passenger-cargo ships as container ships were already taking a large chunk of the liner business (and in this type William Lines and Sulpicio Lines joined the race against early pacesetter Aboitiz Shipping Corporation while Compania Maritima did not). So actually by 1983, William Lines and Sulpicio Lines were running even less liners as some old and small ships were either laid up, sold or converted to just carrying cargo.

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MINTERBRO Port, the remains of Compania Maritima in Davao

In 1982, the MV Samar was broken up and in 1983 the MV Luzon was also broken up. Compania Maritima was already near extinction then. It was just the dying dance and after that it was already a battle between William Lines and Sulpicio Lines which is Number 1.

Haters of Old Ships Should Train Their Guns on Liners

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Image from ABS-CBN News

This article is actually intended for the reading (dis)pleasure of the likes of Arben Santos, Christopher Pastrana, Alfonso Cusi and Rey Gamboa who in the past three years or so have been attacking old ships as if they are unworthy or worse as thought of “floating coffins”. They try to make the connection that old ships are bound to sink although they cite no study or empirical evidence to support such conjecture. They also intentionally neglect to cite that human error could simply be the cause of the sinking or hull losses of local ferries and this is what is posited by one experienced Captain. I would really like to read the BMI or Board of Marine Inquiry findings of these mishaps but sadly they are not public. BMI is made by Coastguardmen but the Philippine Coast Guard cannot even feed media reliable and complete statistics on sinkings or hull losses. I wonder if termites or sea water got to those findings first.

There was a conference arranged by the Maritime Industry Industry or MARINA two months ago where are all the shipping companies and shipyards were invited. Sensing the topic will be the culling of old ships, the shipping companies came prepared and with their lawyers (well, I understand one of the functions of lawyers is to protect their clients’ rights). The shipping companies asked if MARINA has a study showing old age was the cause of ship sinkings. Of course MARINA has no such study or studies and so the answer of MARINA was simply, “Noted”. Watta funny answer! I thought they were the experts. At the least that is their line of work. Now I don’t know if they are making a study. Well, I am glad there was a BMI in the past because although their records might not be complete, at least it prevents the twisting of events and results in the past. Now, they better find those records now and fast.

Of course, I would like to help them. Or better yet I would like the public to know the empirical evidence on ship losses so they can judge for themselves. In rearranging my database of maritime hull losses I only took note of the the sinkings and hull losses of the past 25 years or from 1992. 25 years is one generation and so it is long and broad enough and there is sufficient sample. 1992 was also the start of the term of President Fidel V. Ramos which introduced shipping liberalization in the country and he rolled out incentives in the importation of ships. His term was the start of the sharp rise in the importation of ships including ferries. Many will remember too that in his term High Speed Crafts (HSCs) which means catamarans and fastcrafts became a new and successful shipping paradigm in the country.

In my sample I just concentrated on steel-hulled ferries. Why ferries? Because it is ferries that capture the public’s attention and their ire if it sink (of course our media is sensationalistic but without substance). I excluded High Speed Crafts because the comparison to steel-hulled ferries might be inexact (and anyway only four were lost in the same period). I also excluded the wooden-hulled crafts like the motor boats (officially called motor launches) and more so the passenger-cargo motor bancas. Their rates of loss are simple much higher than steel-hulled ferries and the reason is pretty obvious and they will simply skew the comparisons.

In the last 25 years some 56 steel-hulled ferries were lost to various reasons (and that is an average of more than 2 a year) and that includes not only sinkings and founderings but also hull losses due to fire and wrecking. Included were ships lost even when they were not sailing but were caught by typhoons in anchor and which became complete total losses or which capsized and never were salvaged. Of these 56, 16 were liners, 20 were overnight ferries and another 20 were short-distance ferries. And for me that is a very surprising finding. Why? Because pro rata the liners which are the biggest and most well-equipped sink at a greater rate than their smaller counterparts. There are not that many liners but sure there were much more overnight ferries and even more short-distance ferries.

How did that happen?? I don’t have a complete explanation myself. And to think many of the liners have MMSI Numbers hence AIS-equipped. For sure their masters are real Captains whereas in lesser ships a Second Mate will qualify as Captain. And of course their crews are better trained than the crews of the two other classes. Most of our ships that have P&I (Protection and Indemnity) insurance, the most comprehensive insurance are the liners among the ferries. It might be incomprehensible but that is the raw statistics. Liners sink at a faster rate than overnight ferries and short-distance ferries (is that believable?). By the way most of the 56 lost ships are ROROs (Roll-on, Roll-off ships). There were actually very few cruisers among them.

So if Arben Santos, Christopher Pastrana, Alfonso Cusi and Rey Gamboa are really interested in safety, the lesson is maybe they should be more critical, should have a more wary eye of the liners (LOL!). Now I just wonder how Dennis Uy will tell them off. But as they say numbers don’t lie. But for the four gentlemen mentioned I just hope they make their own study first before they open their mouths the next time. Shut down the propaganda and be more objective. They might say liners casualties are rare now. But that is simply because there are so few liners now. And voyages are suspended even if it just a tropical depression with winds of 45kph and swells of less than 1 foot.

For the perusal of the public here are the lost steel-hulled ferries since 1992. This is much, much more complete than what was presented by media which do not know how to do research.

Lost Steel-hulled Ferries Since 1992:

LINERS

OVERNIGHT FERRIES

SHORT-DISTANCE FERRIES

Cebu City (1994)

Aleson III (1994)

Baleno 168 (2013)

Iloilo Princess (2003)

Asia Malaysia (2011)

Baleno Nine (2009)

Philippine Princess (1997)

Asia South Korea (1999)

Baleno Six (2006)

Princess of the Orient (1998)

Asia Thailand (1999)

Baleno Tres (2011)

Princess of the Pacific (2004)

Blue Water Princess 1 (2007)

Ciara Joy (2003)

Princess of the Stars (2008)

Cebu Diamond (1998)

Ivatan (2000s)

Princess of the World (2006)

Dumaguete Ferry (1990’s)

Ivatan Princess (2004)

St. Francis of Assisi (1999)

Hilongos Diamond 2 (2004)

Lady of Carmel (2013)

St. Gregory The Great (2013)

Kalibo Star (1997)

LCT Davao del Norte (1990s)

St. Thomas Aquinas (2013)

Kimelody Cristy (1995)

LCT Gwen Vida (2008)

SuperFerry 3 (2000)

Labangan (1996)

Maharlika Dos (2014)

SuperFerry 6 (2000)

Maria Carmela (2002)

Northern Samar (2006)

SuperFerry 7 (1997)

Princess Camille (2003)

Ruby – 1 (1993)

SuperFerry 9 (2009)

Pulauan Ferry (2000’s)

Ruperto Jr. (1990s)

SuperFerry 14 (2004)

Rosalia 2 (1999)

San Miguel de Ilijan (1990s)

Tacloban Princess (2009)

Sampaguita Ferry 2 (1990s)

Sta. Penafrancia 7 (2006)

San Juan Ferry (2000)

Starlite Atlantic (2016)

Super Shuttle Ferry 7 (2014)

Super Shuttle Ferry 2 (2013)

Super Shuttle RORO 1 (2012)

Super Shuttle Ferry 17 (2014)

Wonderful Star (2000s)

Viva Penafrancia II (2000)

In the classification I looked more at the route of the ship and not if it has bunks or none. I did not include in the list the Mega Asiana and Tagbilaran Ferry that were cannibalized inside a shipyard nor the Roly-2 which capsized in a shipyard but over land. Not also listed were the Dona Virginia and the Our Lady of Banneux which were no longer repaired after grounding and were instead sold to the breakers. The last two were actually liners. In the same manner, I did not include the Starlite Voyager which was sent to the breakers after a grounding incident. Also not listed was the Ocean King II which capsized but not under water and was salvaged to become a RORO freighter. And I did not also list the casino ship Mabuhay Sunshine which was formerly a cruise ship. If all these are counted, the total would have been 64 and 18 would have been liners and 23 would have been overnight ferries and 22 would have been short-distance ferries.

I challenge the four haters of old ships to prove which of those 56 (or 64) steel-hulled ferries were lost due to old age. Well, the might even have determining what were the causes of the loss of the 56.

Two of the ships mentioned above belong to Alfonso Cusi and another one belongs to Christopher Pastrana. 7 of the 16 lost liners belong to the highly-respected WG&A/Aboitiz Transport System/2GO. 6 lost liners belong to the much-maligned Sulpicio Lines.

A Good Ship That Was Not Able To Outrun A Typhoon

The FS-220, when she came to the Philippines in 1960 was among the last “FS” ships that arrived in the country. She was among the batch used by the US Navy after the war for resupply missions and released from service starting in 1959. For reasons that are not yet clear to me I do not know how the newly-established Philippine President Lines (PPL) was able to corner a big chunk of these last-released “FS” ships. And that batch was the envy of many and even abroad because the US Navy knows how to maintain its ships (and it has the budget) and compared to ex-”FS” ships already in the country which just sails and sails that last batch does not have worn engines yet.

The FS-220 was a ship built by Higgins Industries in New Orleans, USA which was the designer and builder of the famous Higgins boats. She measured 54.9 meters by 9.8 meters by 3.2 meters and originally had 573 tons in gross register tonnage. Like most other “FS” ships she was powered by two GM Cleveland engines with a total of 1,000 horsepower and her maximum speed was 12 knots.

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Photo credits: Philippines Herald and Gorio Belen

FS” ships transferred from the US Army (the operator in World War II) to the US Navy for postwar duty usually have alterations already to suit their mission. Many still undergo further conversions here to suit the local shipping needs and situation and that mainly consists of increasing the passenger capacity.

In the Philippine President Lines fleet, the FS-220 became known as the President Roxas. She was the first ship to carry this name in the fleet. She was also known now by the ID IMO 6117958. Upon conversion, she already had three passenger decks including the lowermost where cargo is also stowed. The first route of the President Roxas was Manila-Cebu-Iligan.

The Philippine President Lines did not last long in the inter-island route and when it concentrated on overseas shipping they established the subsidiary Philippine Pioneer Lines in 1963 to take over the inter-island operations and so the President Roxas went to Philippine Pioneer Lines. Her first route for this new company was the quaint Manila-Masbate-Bulan-Allen-Legaspi-Tabaco route. As such she became a Bicol specialist with a slight diversion to Samar. This was the period when sending a ship to Bicol still made sense.

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Photo credits: The Philippine Herald and Gorio Belen

After two major accidents in 1966 which were the floundering of the Pioneer Cebu in a typhoon and the collision involving Pioneer Leyte which lead to her breaking up, Philippine Pioneer Lines ceased operation. In 1967, Galaxy Lines replaced her and the fleet of Philippine Pioneer Lines was transferred into the Galaxy fleet. The President Roxas became the Venus in the fleet of Galaxy Lines where ships were named after constellations.

She did not last long in Galaxy Lines, however, and was sold immediately sold to N&S Lines, Inc. Galaxy Lines no longer had Bicol routes while N&S Lines had Bicol and Samar routes and maybe the reason for the sale was to avoid taking out a ship in those routes. In N&S Lines, she did the Manila-Allen-Carangian (now known as San Jose)-Legaspi (now spelled as Legazpi)-Laoang route. Only the route to Tabaco port was the one practically dropped.

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Photo credits: Manila Times and Gorio Belen

Venus would hold for long that route and leaving Manila every Tuesday at 9pm. Slowly, she became a fixture in this route. In 1976, a new ship, the Queen of Samar of Newport Shipping Lines issued a challenge to her. There were other passenger-cargo ships to her route from Manila with slightly different ports of call but the ships of the New Shipping Lines were the most dangerous as the Queen of Samar was not the only ship that entered the Northern Samar and nearby routes. In fact, it totaled six. I really can’t understand what was the attraction of Northern Samar and the nearby ports to Newport Shipping Lines.

And then from that in just three years the bottom fell out for these routes because suddenly the San Bernardino Strait was connected by the RORO ship Cardinal I of Cardinal Shipping and suddenly buses and trucks from Manila started running to Samar directly. There was no longer any need to bring the cargo to North Harbor. Ditto for the passengers. Suddenly, the viability of the Samar routes began to evaporate and what was just propping it up was the intermediate route to Masbate.

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Gorio Belen research in the National Library

Though the Manila ships began to evaporate too in the routes passing through San Bernardino Strait especially those that had concentration to Bicol, the Venus was one of the most resilient and she outlasted practically every other passenger-cargo ship in the Northern Samar routes when to think buses and trucks were already arriving daily there. Maybe there were passengers which still prefer the ship or might have been too attached to them.

Nearing her 40th year of life, Venus was sailing from Samar to Manila. There was a Category 5 super-typhoon then approaching the Philippines from the east and its central pressure was 880 millibars which is even lower than Typhoon “Yolanda”’s 890 millibars (the lower the number the stronger is the typhoon). There was also a typhoon that was developing in South China See at the same time. Maybe Venus thought that by sailing she will be putting distance from the stronger typhoon and might have underestimated or failed to notice the storm in South China Sea which was just a tropical depression when she sailed. It seems Venus also failed to understand well the effects on the sea of a Sibuyan Sea. The two typhoons were actually interacting and in fact the stronger typhoon was sucking the weaker one. Venus might have failed to understand well the risks when she embarked on her final voyage.

It was in Sibuyan Sea when Venus finally discovered the sea was roiling and the winds were unforgiving. The ex-”FS” ships were particularly vulnerable to typhoons and that was why her old captains here were masters of finding the coves and inlets where they can hide or shelter the ship when the weather acts up.

It seems Venus tried to hightail it to a port or was desperately trying to find shelter (as she already diverted from her route if gauged from where she perished). However, in Tayabas Bay it seems Venus was not able to weather the wind and the waves and floundered on October 28, 1984 (in Tayabas Bay the winds then will be hitting her broadside at port). There was no trace of the ship after the typhoon and 36 people perished with her, unfortunately.

On a note, the Lorenzo Container VIII of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation was another ship that floundered in that twin interacting storm. This even bigger ship sank on the same day as Venus north of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, in a sea which is even farther than the stronger typhoon (which was incidentally named also as Typhoon “Reming” like the deadliest storm to visit Bicol in the recent decades).

The sinking of Venus even had repercussions in our place. When about to ride a ship, my earthbound relatives would remind me of her fate (you know the oldies then!). The floundering in another typhoon of the Dona Marilyn in a nearby sea, the Samar Sea, four years later in 1988 did not help either.

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Photo credits: Times Journal and Gorio Belen

The Venus served the same route for 17 years. That was long by any local measure. It took two typhoons to end her memorable career. Small shipping companies really take hard a sinking and coupled with weakening routes and the general crisis of that era, the Ninoy post-assassination years, N&S Lines, her company also went under.

After the sinking of Venus, the routes to Northern Samar from Manila also died. In the 1990’s MBRS Lines from Romblon tried to revive it. But there was really no way to defeat the new paradigm, the intermodal system. And so it died again. Finally.

The Smallest and Last Japan “Cruiseferry” To Come To The Philippines

In the late 1960’s, the “Bypasses of the Sea” came into existence in Japan. These were long-distance ROROs (actually ROPAXes) meant to bypass the crowded roads of Japan which was experiencing a sustained economic boom then in what was called the “Japan Miracle” which brought the former war-defeated and occupied country into the forefront of the ranks of nations (Number 2 in fact later). These “Bypasses of the Sea” were workmanlike and were primarily geared to the trucks and its crews and also to passengers in average comfort. Some of these ROROs actually came to the Philippines when they were retired in Japan like the Filipina Princess, the Princess of Paradise, the Princess of the World, the Manila Bay 1, the Subic Bay 1 and the Mary Queen of Peace.

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Photo by Wakanatsu

In the next decade, aside from the “Bypasses of the Sea”, a new class of ROROs came into existence in Japan. These were bigger and much more comfortable with hotel-like facilities. These were later dubbed as “cruiseferries”, a portmanteau. These were like cruise ships in comfort and service but as the same time these were still “Bypasses of the Sea”. As “cruiseferries”, these were more geared to attract passengers but these still had the car decks for the trucks and sedans. The “cruiseferries” being faster that most ROROs can travel more distances and longer routes and can cover most of their routes in a night or so, in great comfort. “Sanfurawaa” or the series of Sunflower ships were the leader in this new class and three of their ships eventually went to the Philippines after their retirement. They were known as Princess of the Orient, Mabuhay 1 and Princess of Unity in our waters.

The “cruiseferry” class did not last long, however. In the 1980’s, Japan were no longer building them as passengers were already preferring other modes of transport like the budget planes and the now-ubiquitous “Bullet” trains. The Japan shipping companies scaled back in comfort and began dedicating two decks of the ship to rolling cargo. However, there was still enough comfort for those who seek them although it was no longer as opulent as the “cruiseferries”. Dormitories and second-class cabins were the dominant passenger classes now. These class of ships were called the “carferries” and some of these also reached the Philippines when they were retired in Japan. They were known here as the SuperFerry 12, SuperFerry 15, SuperFerry 16, SuperFerry 17, SuperFerry 18, SuperFerry 20, SuperFerry 21, Princess of the Universe, St. Michael The Archangel and St. Francis Xavier.

There are also other Japan companies which ventured into “cruiseferries”. One of these is the Sanpo Kaiun K.K. which is just a small company. It acquired the White Sanpo 2 in 1981 and she was relatively big compared to their previous ships. This ship was well-appointed it qualified into a “cruiseferry” class albeit a little smaller than the other Japan “cruiseferries”. Her route was Kobe-Imabari-Matsuyama. The year she was acquired, Japan shipping companies were still acquiring “cruiseferries”. It will be just be a little later that the “cruiseferries” will be supplanted by the “carferries”.

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Photo by Britz Salih

In 2000, White Sanpo 2 came to the Philippines after 19 years of service in Japan and she became the SuperFerry 14 of William, Gothong and Aboitiz or WG&A. This was the first ferry not originally ordered by the partners which means it was already the merged company which acquired her. She was also the last Japan “cruiseferry” that came here. Passengers were asking why the later big ferries from Japan were no longer as luxurious. The reason was it was already “carferries” that were coming and no longer “cruiseferries”. Actually, the presence of two car decks is the giveaway the ship that came is a “carferry”.

The SuperFerry 14 was not really as small ship since her length was 155 meters which is nearly 5 meters longer than the sister ships SuperFerry 20, SuperFerry 21, St. Michael The Archangel and St. Francis Xavier and the sister ships St. Peter The Apostle and St. Joseph The Worker and she was just two meter shorter than SuperFerry 8. However if compared to the SuperFerry 6, SuperFerry 10, SuperFerry 12, the Princess of the Universe, the Princess of Paradise, the Princess of the World, the Princess of New Unity, the Mary Queen of Peace, the Manila Bay 1 and the Subic Bay 1 (and of course the earlier Filipina Princess) she would look “small”. It was simply the time that our shipping companies were acquiring bigger and bigger liners and with large passenger capacities too. During that period, liners of 3,000-passenger capacity were already becoming the norm.

The White Sanpo 2 or SuperFerry 14 was actually 155.6 meters by 23.6 meters in dimension with a depth of 13.0 meters. Her gross tonnage (GT) was 10,181 meters in Japan and 10,192 meters in the Philippines. The reason for the almost identical GT was her superstructure here was no longer modified and no decks were added. She was one of the early big liners here where the superstructure was left untouched and the passenger capacity was not maximized. Others like her in this treatment were the Mabuhay 1 or SuperFerry 10 and the Princess of New Unity. For her bigness, SuperFerry 14 only had a passenger capacity of 1,757. Other liners of her length and in her time had passenger capacities of well over 2,000 persons. Her net tonnage (NT) was 4,957.

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The ship with the green sundeck is SuperFerry 14 (copyrights are in the photo)

The White Sanpo 2, the future SuperFerry 14 was built by Hayashikane Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Ltd. in their Shimonoseki yard in Japan in 1981. She has three passenger decks and a single car deck which was accessible by ramps at the bow and the stern. Her design and lines were pretty much traditional of her period. The ship has a semi-bulbous stem and a transom stern and powered by two main engines, all of which were standard in the design of her era. Her permanent ID was IMO 8004210.

Her speed was also par for the course for the big liners then of 150 meters length in the Philippines except for those that didn’t look sleek enough (like the Manila Bay 1 and SuperFerry 6 which looked fat and were not capable of 20 knots here). Since her design speed in Japan was 21 knots, she was still capable of 20 knots here especially since not much metal was added because no decks were added to her. That speed came from a pair of SEMT-Pielstick engines that developed 23,400 horsepower.

As a former “cruiseferry”, SuperFerry 14 had luxurious interiors and accommodations many of which were simply carried over from her Japan features. Since WG&A had many good ships already in the Cebu and Iloilo routes, she was then used by the company to compete with the Negros Navigation ships in the Manila-Bacolod-Cagayan de Oro route. Bacolod was once closed to other shipping companies except for Negros Navigation since they operate privately the only suitable port for big liners then, the Banago port. With the opening of the BREDCO port, WG&A challenged in the Manila-Bacolod-Cagayan de Oro route and SuperFerry 14 was more than a match to the Mary The Queen and the St. Joseph The Worker of NENACO in the Cagayan de Oro route.

First Try

A drawing by Ken Ledesma

The SuperFerry 14 did not sail long, however. On the night of February 27, 2004, a bomb exploded in a Tourist section on a lower deck of the ship an hour and a half after leaving Manila North Harbor when the ship was at the mouth of Manila Bay. The explosion triggered a fire which soon engulfed the whole ship. The firefighting crew of the ship was overwhelmed and the rescue was chaotic. Some passengers simply jumped into the dark sea and some were feared drowned in the aftermath. To think, it was even fortunate that the incident happened in waters near where rescue ships can reach the ship fast.

Rescuers including tugs and a helicopter tried to douse the fire consuming the ship and eventually the fire was controlled. The ship was towed to Bataan even while burning as capsizing will mean a greater loss. On shore, the vessel capsized but she was righted and search and rescue operations continued. With the vessel afloat, rescuers were able to comb the ship and probers investigated the cause of the fire. There was really a blast site that looked like it came from a bomb. The claims of the crew of a bomb exploding was validated.

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Photo from http://www.infolagoon.com

Although the Abu Sayyaf Group immediately claimed responsibility for the firebombing, the government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo initially dismissed a terrorist attack and instead blamed it on some sort of an accident (the government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had the habit of denying terrorist attacks until conclusively proven). But later when suspects from the Rajah Solaiman Movement affiliated with the Abu Sayyaf were captured and admitted what happened to SuperFerry 14, the government changed tune and admitted that what brought the ferry down was really a bomb placed inside a TV set.

Whatever and later, the estimate was some 63 people died and about 53 were missing in the incident for a total body count of about 116. That figure does not include the wounded. Some of the casualties were bright students from an elite school, the MSU-IIT-IDS of Iligan City in Lanao and that included the second-ranking student of the graduating class (she was later given a posthumous joint Salutatorian award by the school).

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Photo from The 4Freedoms Library

SuperFerry 14 never sailed again as her condition is BER (Beyond Economic Repair). In databases, she is marked as CTL (Complete Total Loss). There were pictures of her where the fire was even consuming the bridge of the ship. Besides, passengers don’t want to ride a ship where there was a lot of dead in a previous accident.

A very fine ship but SuperFerry 14 was really unfortunate.

The Liner That Sank A Liner Company (The Saga of the Princess of the Stars)

The Princess of the Stars of Sulpicio Lines Incorporated was the biggest-ever liner to grace the Philippine seas. She was not the longest, however, because such honor belonged to the Princess of the Orient, also of Sulpicio Lines but compared to that liner the Princess of the Stars was wider and taller and for confirmation, her Gross Tonnage (GT), the measure of the total volume of the ship, was higher. In the comparison, the M/S Philippines of Emilio Yap was excluded because that ship was not a sailing liner but a floating hotel when it came here.

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Photo from homepagenifty2

The Princess of the Stars was the second Ferry Lilac of Shin Nihonkai Ferry Company which is known in Japan for building big liners that sail the open waters of Japan. Shin Nihonkai was among the companies that offered the “Bypasses of the Sea” service in the earlier decades in Japan which meant big, fast ROROs that took in vehicles along sea lanes instead of it battling the clogged highways of Japan then. From utilitarian ROROs, that concept evolved into the “cruiseferries” in the 1970’s which offered hotel-like accommodations aside from being able to carry vehicles. When patronage weakened in the 1980’s due to the rise of other modes of transports that evolved into the “carferries” which is again utilitarian but more comfortable than the first generation of long-distance RORO’s that appeared in the 1960’s.

The Ferry Lilac already belonged to the “carferries” class when built and much like the New Miyako which became the SuperFerry 12 in the Philippines for they were built in the same year but Ferry Lilac was much bigger than the New Miyako. When completed in July of 1984, Ferry Lilac was the largest RORO-passenger ship existing in Japan. She was assigned the Maizuru-Otaru route that passes through the Sea of Japan in the western seaboard of that country. As a “carferry”, although she still had suite rooms and other high class rooms, the emphasis was already on food and restaurants, live entertainment and shows and on game halls. Her capacity was 554 passengers but after remodeling that increased to 788 passengers. Her design and equipment were supposedly of the latest of the period being the “ultimate carferry” then.

The Ferry Lilac‘s design philosophy followed what was the naval design thinking then. Japan researchers determined that the swells of the open seas of Japan has an average of 140 to 145 meters between crests and so they suggested that the length of the liners be greater than that. The belief was that the ship would be able to ride between two crests and such will not pitch too much. However, it seems that was a naive assumption because after the ship’s bow rose with the coming swell the bow will then sink after the swell passed the center of the ship. In Youtube, there are videos of ship bow that appears to be submarining into the sea (of course, it will rise again). This phenomenon also happens to all kinds of ships including container ships, bulkers, military ships and other kind of ships in the heavy swells of the open seas.

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Photo by Joel Bado

The second Ferry Lilac was tall and she had high sides and the superstructure encompasses the whole ship. The philosophy behind the high sides is it serves as a protection against big waves including rogue waves and in case the ship listed she will not take in water easily hence forestalling capsizing. That was proven in later cases like the Ariake (which was hit by a rogue wave) and the Cougar Ace which did not immediately sink even though their sides were already lying in the water. I do not know if the design philosophies mentioned in this paragraph and the previous one weighed on the decision to risk her in a typhoon later. I heard her company was very confident in her ability to survive heavy seas as supposedly these big “carferries” were designed to survive seas generated by tropical cyclones of 120-130kph center wind strength.

The second Ferry Lilac was built by Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) in Aioi shipyard in Japan in 1984 and had the permanent ID IMO 8323161. Her dimensions were 192.9 meters by 29.4 meters with a gross register tonnage (GRT) of 18,268 tons. This later rose to 23,824 in gross tonnage (GT) with a net tonnage (NT) of 16,040. Its DWT (deadweight tonnage) was 7,670. The ferry was big but was not really built for speed unlike the big ferries of Japan in the previous decade as her design speed was only 21.5 knots. The power comes from SEMT-Pielstick engines that develops only 26,400 horsepower.

The ferry was released from Japan in 2004 after twenty years of service and went to Sulpicio Lines Inc. There was minimal refitting and there was no change in the superstructure and most works were done just in Cebu port. The refitting were mainly on how the facilities of the ship will conform to local conditions like the provision of an Economy Class and its corresponding Economy restaurant. Otherwise, the facilities and comforts of the ship were already more than enough as with the space for passengers. In the period of her arrival, passenger load of the liners was already declining and so there was no longer any pull to greatly increase the passenger capacity which was just limited to 1,992, a far cry from the 3,912 of the Princess of the Orient which was similar to her in size.

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Photo from Wakanatsu

When Princess of the Stars was fielded she became the flagship of Sulpicio Lines vice the Princess of the Universe. As flagship, she did the Manila-Cebu route twice a week. Sailing, she usually catches the attention of observers for her sheer size. Docked in Manila or Cebu, she simply dwarfed the other ferries and with her height she simply towered above the other ferries. But unlike what others may expect, she was not led by the most senior captain of Sulpicio Lines. Others declined because they know handling a ship that big is more demanding. Looked from an angle, ships of these size were not really designed for Philippine waters. That size might have been demanded when passenger demand was still strong but not in the new millennium and Princess of the Stars might just be part a showcase. More kindly, she can also be looked as the replacement of the big and luxurious Princess of New Unity which was sold to breakers that same year.

The Princess of the Stars did not sail long, however. Sailing on the night of June 20, 2008 for Cebu, she failed to stop and seek shelter unlike two ships of Aboitiz Transport System which dropped anchor and sought shelter in Puerto Galera because of a coming typhoon. The Princess of the Stars simply sailed on when the evening news already warned of Typhoon “Frank” that will pass the northern coast of Leyte on a collision course with the Princess of the Stars (she left Manila at 8pm and the evening news was 6:30pm). The expected strength then of the typhoon was some 120-130kph which was theoretically within the capacity of the ship to handle. Was the voyage a test case of her strength in Philippine typhoons?

I always wondered about the bravado of the Princess of the Stars. Normally before when there was a storm in Eastern Visayas and the ship wanted to still sail to Cebu or northern Mindanao they take the southern route which means from Verde Island Passage the ship turns to Tablas Strait instead of pursuing the route passing through the Sibuyan Sea. The ship will then sail through the seas off the western side of Panay island and then turn to Panay Gulf and round Negros island on its southern part and then head northward to Cebu port. The wind and swells will be strong in Sulu Sea but the ship will be farther from the eye of the typhoon and after rounding the southwest tip of Panay island the wind and swells will already be at the stern of the ship and the rocking will be less. I have been aboard such detours in the past and I know this custom.

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Photo by Rodney Orca

Tucked in and sheltered by an island, the wind and swells will be moderated and not that much felt in a ship. It is after venturing in the open when the roughness of the sea begins. In the past, our ships has learned to use the cover of the islands if they are not seeking shelter. Even small islands like the Romblon islands provide a measure of cover.

By next morning, Typhoon “Frank” was stronger (it was already developing more strength that night) and its strength was already 165kph, a strength that is not to be messed with. Well, ships going from Australia and the Philippines that pass through our eastern seaboard don’t drop anchor and seek shelter. But they know how to distance themselves from the typhoon. This can be verified through AIS. Where a typhoon is passing the area is clear of ships. Some stop, some take a detour and some seek shelter and drop anchor. Princess of the Stars was in the vicinity of a typhoon and in fact was in a collision course but did neither of the three evasive actions mentioned previously. She simply sailed on until she was already in the eye of the typhoon. Actually, that was a feat of seamanship – to sail into the eye of a strong typhoon. Few can do that (restated, only fools do that).

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Taken from http://www.typhoon2000.com

But the ship did not survive and capsized off the southeast coast of Sibuyan island in an inverted position and stuck in a reef which saved the ship from sinking completely. However, that was no use to most of the passengers and crew of the ship as only 54 survived while 814 were dead or missing and some were washed far away.

Like the Dona Paz tragedy, the Princess of the Stars sinking caused national and international outcry and shamed Sulpicio Lines to heights greater than the Dona Paz tragedy where there was still dispute then who was really at fault in the collision that torched and sank Dona Paz. In the Princess of the Stars case there was no one to blame except for Sulpicio Lines. The company tried to blame the government forecasting agency PAGASA but that did not gain traction. One thing was sure in the accident, the ship was not using state-of-the-art forecasting services like INMARSAT which was the first one to declare that the missing Malaysian Airlines jet MH370 veered south and was lost in the Indian Ocean (when that was not their function or service).

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Credits: NAMRIA and PDI

The backlash of this tragedy was so great it also sank the passenger service of Sulpicio Lines. Now they are forever barred from engaging in passenger liner shipping. And until now they are still haunted by suits. They were even forced to rename their company into the Philippine Span Asia Carrier Corporation (PSACC).

With the sinking, the Philippine government also tightened regulations on sailings during storms. Now, no Philippine ship can sail when the winds reach 60kph or even less at times. Above that only foreign ships are still sailing our waters.

And that is the ironic thing I find now. Imagine only foreign ships can sail our waters when the wind blows. All because of the Princess of the Stars.

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Photo by Britz Salih

Note: I don’t know who wrote the Wikipedia article of Princess of the Stars. It has errors in the specifications of the ship.

In the Philippines, No-Name, Shoddy Ferries Have a Better Safety Record Than Internationally-Certificated Ferries

A candidate for Ripley’s “Believe It or Not”? That’s true and so better read on.

Yesterday, it was in the news that Christopher Pastrana, The Boastful is hosting the 41st Interferry Conference that will be held in Manila starting today, October 15. There will be many sponsors for that and it is usually attended by shipping owners, shipbuilders, marine engine makers, various suppliers and other entities connected to shipping to exchange notes and learn about the latest trends and products. By the way, Interferry is not the sole organizer of maritime conferences.

A news item said the FastCats of Pastrana can provide safe ferries as do the ferries of Starlite and the implication is because those are new. Well, not so fast as it is not just the newness of the ship that is a factor in safety. May I remind too that Pastrana lost the Maharlika Dos to capsizing and sinking near Panaon island in 2014 after its engines failed and his Maharlika Cuatro, though just nearby, did not come to its rescue. And Starlite Voyager grounded and reached BER status when it was on the way to a shipyard in 2011. Are they blaming now the oldness of their vessels that sank?

I was angry when Maharlika Dos capsized and sank in 2014 because Pastrana broke the 35-year record of Bicol steel-hulled ferries not sinking while sailing ever since the RORO Cardinal Ferry 2 of Cardinal Shipping came in 1979. The Northern Samar sank in 2006 in a storm but she was not sailing and was just moored in Tabaco port. This perfect record extends to Surigao Strait because no steel-hulled ferries ever sank there since Cardinal Ferry 2 came in 1980, a record that Maharlika Dos broke infamously.

And to think the eastern seaboard short-distance ferry routes are home to the some of the most shoddy ROROs in Philippine waters led by the Maharlika ships of Christopher Pastrana and the Millennium Uno of Millennium Shipping. Well, the ships of Bicolandia Shipping then were also not topnotch and are old. But no matter what these ferries don’t sink even though the eastern seaboard straits are among the most dangerous in the country. As I have said in an earlier article it is seamanship that carried them through. The seamen there would not let their ships sink because they know that among their passengers might be their kins, their friends, their school mates or somebody known to them. But Maharlika Cuatro‘s captain didn’t know that and so he let Maharlika Dos wallow in the ever-strengthening swells until it capsized. And now since he got new FastCats, Pastrana always boasts now about safety and misses no chance to deride the “lack of safety” of his rivals. What gall!

Before Pastrana or even Cusi of Starlite Ferries, another boastful owner, gets carried away let me state that going by the records and empirically there are a lot of ferry companies which are their rivals which have a perfect safety record, i.e. they did not lose ships to sinking. In Bicol, Sta. Clara Shipping, Penafrancia Shipping, Regina Shipping Lines and 168 Shipping Lines have never lost a ferry of theirs. That goes true to the defunct ferry companies that served Bicol like Cardinal Shipping, Newport Shipping, Badjao Navigation and the short-serving Luzvimin Ferry Services. Well, even Denica Lines have not lost a steel-hulled ferry so far.

Going to Quezon, the safety record of the decrepit-looking ships of Kalayaan Shipping have a perfect safety record as do the defunct Sta. Cruz Shipping. Alabat Shipping also has a perfect safety record as do Phil-Nippon Kyoei when they were still existing. Noting these ferry companies, I purposely omitted those that have short service records like Starhorse Shipping.

In Western Visayas, Milagrosa-J Shipping and Tri-Star Megalink both have perfect safety records even though Milagrosa-J Shipping regularly crosses the Sulu Sea which has rough seas and strong winds many months of the year. And to think their sea crafts are small and are already old. It is really in the seamanship.

Batangas shipping companies have no great safety record especially Besta Shipping. But I would like to point out that for a ferry company which has a fleet of over 30, Montenegro Shipping Lines lost only one ferry in 20 years even though they can be found almost anywhere in the Philippines including those that have rough seas. They only lost the Maria Carmela when somebody threw a cigarette butt into a copra truck and thereby igniting a conflagration which was rather unfortunate. And Montenegro Lines have some of the oldest ships hereabouts.

Zamboanga is home to some of ferries that will not look so clean internally and many are also old. But two sailing companies there, Ever Lines and Magnolia Shipping, probably the Number 2 and Number 3 there have perfect safety records as they have not lost a ship even in their freighters. And Sulu, Tawi-tawi and Celebes Sea have strong seas when there is a storm somewhere in eastern Philippines or when the monsoons are blowing hard. Minor shipping companies of Zamboanga like Sing Shipping and Ibnerizam Shipping also have perfect records. The defunct Basilan Lines/Basilan Shipping of the Alanos also did not lose a ship although their Dona Ramona was bombed in Lamitan City.

Mae Wess of Davao has not also lost a ship as do the KSJ Shipping of Surigao. And as far as I know, the currently operating ferry companies of Camiguin – Philstone Shipping, Davemyr Shipping, and Hijos de Juan Corrales have not lost a ship too and it seems that also goes true for the defunct P.N. Roa and and Jade Sea Express. In Panguil Bay, Daima Shipping has not also lost a ship even though their Our Lady of Mediatrix was burned because of the firebombing of two Super 5 buses aboard her in 2000.

In Cebu, for all the size of their fleet Lite Ferries may not lost a vessel (was the Sta. Lucia de Bohol lost at sea?). FJP Lines/Palacio Shipping, defunct now, also has a perfect safety record. There are other defunct shipping companies of Cebu which has not lost a ship through accident and that includes VG Shipping, Roly Shipping/Godspeed, Kinswell Shipping, Jadestar Shipping, Goldenbridge Shipping, Maayo Shipping, Cuadro Alas Navigation, PAR Transport plus many smaller ferry companies. In the recent era, Gabisan Shipping are known for safety and the ability to “read” the waves and have not yet lost one.

If I go by routes, there was not a ferry lost in Roxas-Caticlan and Dapitan-Dumaguete even though their seas can sometimes be rough. No steel-hulled ferry was ever lost in any route in Bicol too except for the Blue Water Princess 2 which is a Quezon ferry going to Masbate and the Rosalia 2, a Cebu craft going to Cataingan, Masbate. There are many, many other routes in the country which has not seen a ship sink even though they are not using a new ship. It is all in the seamanship really. To say a new ships is “safer” is just like claiming a new car will not be involved in a collision.

Some of our HSC companies too are very safe. Oceanjet, the Number 1 now in HSCs, has not lost a ship ever and they did not always use new crafts. Weesam Express also has a perfect record. Even the defunct Bullet Express, the fastcrafts of the Viva Shipping Lines combine and the fastcrafts of A. Sakaluran have perfect safety records. The are a lot of other HSC companies which had perfect records but their service record was short like Star Crafts. Not included here is SuperCat which has lost one.

And which brings me to our liners which in the recent years are internationally-certificated, have P&I insurance and are mostly spic-and-span but unfortunately have a bad safety record. In the last 20 years, WG&A/CFC lost SuperFerry 3, SuperFerry 6 and SuperFerry 7, all to fire and Dona Virginia and Our Lady of Banneux due to grounding. Aboitiz Transport System (ATS) also lost the SuperFerry 14 to a terrorist act and the St. Gregory The Great to grounding. Sulpicio Lines lost the Princess of the Stars and Princess of the Orient to capsizing and lost the Princess of the World, Philippine Princess and the Iloilo Princess to fire and the Princess of the Pacific to grounding. Negros Navigation also lost the St. Francis of Assisi to fire.

Between the end of the World War II and 1995 I know of 75 (that is seventy-five) liners which were lost and mainly at sea. That is 75 in only 30 years! Can anybody believe that? So how can I be impressed by liners and international certificates in safety? Or in their being spic and span? The records say otherwise. And believe me I can easily name the 75 as I have my own database about maritime hull losses. This 75 does not even include regional ships like the Boholana Princess which was an overnight ship when she was lost.

The Don Juan and Cebu City were brand-new ships when they were fielded in the Philippines. But they sank in collisions at night. So Pastrana and Cusi be better warned by their boastfulness of their new ships. They better be more humble before shipping companies which have not ever lost a ship.

Newness of a ship is not a guarantee of anything except in shininess.

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Photo credit: Masahiro Homma

Maritime Hull Losses and Its Lack of Connection to the Age of the Ship

Maritime accidents like collisions are fairly common but that kind of accident does not necessarily result in sinking. Most actually end up with the ships just having dents in their hulls. Capsizing also happens but not all ships that capsize actually sink though they might be touching the sea bottom (because it is in shallow waters). Government authorities are wont to use the term “sinking” but I prefer not to use that term in describing maritime events that results in dead ships because not all ships that figured in maritime accidents actually sink.

The term I prefer to use is “maritime hull losses” since sinking is not the only cause of sailing ships ending up as dead ships. Like fire on the ship that does not sink or beaching of the ship to save the passengers and crew or even wrecking to escape the wrath of the sea. In calamitous events like those, the ship lies over land or might still have buoyancy but the ship ends up dead because it is Beyond Economic Repair or BER. Usually the ending of those three events I mentioned is the breaking up of the ship. To repeat, the ship ends up dead but it did not actually sink.

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Photo Credit: Joel Bado

Sinking is also not an irreversible event. There are sinkings where the ship was refloated after. It can be done if it is in shallow waters and near the shore. Some of the refloated ships are repaired and still sail after that. But many are refloated just to be broken up. The steel of the ship though sunk is still valuable as scrap metal.

I have a database of 350 plus ships from the conclusion of World War II that ended up as maritime hull losses. I suspect this is far from complete since the distribution is skewed in favor of the recent years. What that probably means is there was under-reporting or paucity of reporting in our earlier years or records were lost. This is much possible since many of our ships have IMO Numbers and not all were built by the mainstream shipyards and those are barely covered by the international maritime databases. And the listing of local authorities including MARINA and the Philippine Coast Guard is even more lacking than the international maritime databases.

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Photo Credit: Vince Emille Malazarte

My database of 350 plus maritime hull losses does not include motor bancas unless it is really significant or really big. There are no fishing bancas included and very few steel-hulled fishing vessels are included. And to think that among ship categories fishing bancas and motor bancas will probably rank Number 1 and Number 2 in terms of maritime hull losses and most of them are outright sinking. These are vulnerable crafts and fishing vessels can be caught by storms in the seas because historically PAGASA in not good in making local forecasts (they can only do regional, provincial or city forecasts unlike international weather sites and maritime weather services). Motor bancas can be caught too even without a storm as the wind and waves on the other side of the island might be different from where they came.

The causes of the 350 maritime hull losses can be roughly divided into the following:

  1. Foundering

  2. Wrecking

  3. Grounding that resulted in BER

  4. Capsizing and sinking

  5. Capsizing but not sinking (but BER)

  6. Collision and sinking

  7. Fire, both sunk and not sunk (but BER)

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Photo Credit: Britz Salih

Foundering almost always happens in a storm or typhoon when the ship takes in an excess of water in the hull making it lose it balance. In such case the cargo or the rolling cargo can shift and cause a list. If the pumps fail or it can’t function because of the list it is usually goodbye to the ship already. Foundering can also be caused by the ship’s engine conking out in a storm. In such cases the ship cannot maneuver and will take in water faster. If the ship can’t bail out water fast enough freeboard is lost and soon water will begin entering through spaces that cannot really be sealed enough (and that is why it was already proven that high sides to a ship is a plus for survival). Foundering can be technically called a navigation error. In the main it will not connote that the ship is already old unless the failure of the engine was the primary cause of foundering. But then engine failure can also be caused by shoddy maintenance which is not necessarily old age.

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Photo Credit: Manila Chronicle and Gorio Belen

Wrecking is usually an emergency maneuver of a ship to escape a frothing sea it cannot survive. It is much better than foundering because most of the lives in the ship is saved while in foundering lucky is the soul that can survive the roiling seas that made victim of their ship. And besides in wrecking the remains of the ship can still be salvaged. However, in wrecking there is so much damage in the hull, propeller, rudders and other parts of the ship that it becomes BER especially if the hull is breached in beaching and takes in water. Even without breaching of the hull a storm can also pour so much water into the ship. Wrecking is not be a navigation error and there is also no link to the age of the ship.

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Photo Credit: Salvtug and John Carlos Cabanillas

In grounding, the ship touched bottom while running or hit a rock while sailing. Grounding is certainly a navigation error and it has no connection to the age of the ship unless it was caused by the failure of the steering mechanism. Sometimes grounding are suspected to be an attempt to wreck the ship to just collect insurance but grounding is not common the recent years. Many ships ground actually but few suffer hull breaching that is enough for the ship to be declared BER.

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Photo Credit: Aris Refugio

In capsizing and sinking, there might be a storm or there might not. Sometimes a ship will be hit by a rogue wave, then list if the cargo shifts (rolling cargo is prone to this) and later capsize or is beached. Sometimes there will be a hole that let water into the hull but was only usual in the decades past when hull strength is not yet tested during drydocking. At times a ship will be lost at sea without another ship able to assist and the presumption will first be “missing” and then capsizing and sinking if there is no storm in the vicinity and sufficient time has passed and there is no more sighting of the ship. [It is considered foundering if there was a storm in the vicinity.] In most cases it cannot be connected to the age of the ship unless the hull simply developed a hole. Breaking of the hull into two is not even considered automatically due to old age as the ship might still be new but there was a design defect.

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Ships can also capsize but not sink. These happens when the ship is anchored near the shore in shallow waters, moored in the docks or was even in a shipyard. Sometimes the cause is a storm or a typhoon but since the ship is not navigating then it is not called foundering but instead it is called capsizing. A ship capsizing while moored might have damage that could be considered BER. Events like this also have no direct correlation to the age of the ship unless the previous failure is associated with the age of the ship like perhaps the steering mechanism having a mechanical failure or simply dropped to the sea.

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Photo Credit: Lindsay Bridge

In collision and sinking the hull of the ship is breached letting water in and making the ship lose balance and buoyancy. If the ship goes down fast then many lives can be lost especially if it happens at night. This has also no direct correlation to the age of the ship since the ramming ship does not ask first what is the age of the ship being rammed. It can be new, it can be old.

 

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Photo Credit: Philippine Herald and Gorio Belen

In cases of fire, the ship might sink or might not. If it did not and it resulted in a hull loss it is because the point of BER was reached. This usually happens if the fire started in the engine room fire or a large percentage of the hull of the ship burned especially if it included the bridge. In sustained high temperatures, the superstructure of the ship is compromised and sometimes buckles. In all the 7 cases this might be the case which has the nearest connection to age but it might also just be simple poor maintenance on the part of the shipping company or even weak response of the firefighting crew

There is a small percentage among the 350 plus maritime hull losses of being bombed or there was an explosion or the ship was lost in enemy action (in Vietnam). Again these three cannot be directly connected to the age of the ship.

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Photo Credit: Infolagoon and Ramiro Aranda Jr.

So I really wonder about this plan of Secretary Tugade of culling ships that are 35 years old. Definitely, there is no empirical or historical evidence supporting that. As the shipowners pointed out there is no rule in the IMO (International Maritime Organization) or anywhere that ships over 35 years old must be retired. They are only retired if they can no longer meet inspection or qualification requirements.

The way I observe Secretary Tugade, it is obvious he does not know ships or maritime issues. Maybe he should quit listening to the whispers of Secretary Cusi who has vested interest in shipping and maybe he should study ships first and maritime issues. I am sure his lawyer training did not include maritime courses.

Early in President Duterte’s term I expressed fears against fiats especially fiats that favor vested interests. We might see one developing now.

Some Musings on Ship Sinkings

Lately, there have been rumors that ferries of over 35 years old will be phased out and supposedly one of those pushing that is the current Secretary of Transportation which is Arthur Tugade and also supposedly involved is Alfonso Cusi, Secretary of Energy who is a shipping owner (Starlite Ferries). I do not know what Tugade knows about ships. He is a lawyer. Cusi, meanwhile has vested interest in the issue. Shipping owners got so alarmed that a meeting between them was called and attended by different shipping companies and they voiced opposition to such move which is also supported by the regional director of MARINA Central Visayas.

The proposal to phase out ferries is rooted in the belief that it is old age that sinks ships. Unfortunately, that is simply not true, that is just an assumption by those who have no true knowledge of shipping and empirical evidence do not support that. As one knowledgeable Captain said, it is human error that is the most common cause of sinking and I agree to that.

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Photo Credit: Dr. Normand Fernandez

I just wish when media and government officials discuss ship sinking that they be more specific and don’t use the term generically. Sometimes a ship is simply wrecked as in it lies on the shore incapable of sailing but it is not under water. Some of these can still be refloated and still sail later. This happened to many ships caught by the storm surges of super-typhoons like the Typhoon “Ruping” of 1990 and Typhoon “Yolanda” of 2008. Old age was not the cause of the capsizing or wrecking of those caught in those typhoons as most were actually in shelter and not navigating. In maritime databases they call these events “wrecking”. They will even indicate if it was refloated and indicate “broken up” when that was the subsequent fate of the wrecked ship.

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Photo Credit: Philippine Star and Gorio Belen

Sometimes a ship loses buoyancy and capsize but not all of them sink to the bottom of the sea. Those on their side or even upside down but located in ports or in shallow waters can still be righted and salvaged and maybe it will still be capable of sailing after repairs if it is not Beyond Economic Repair (BER). Most of these cases are results of accidents like errors in unloading cargo (like Ocean Legacy or Danica Joy 2) or even ramming like Dingalan Bay and not from the age of the ship. Some had their rolling cargo shift due to rogue waves but reach port, and subsequently capsize like what happened in Ocean King II in Benit port. Some capsize in port due to action of other ships like what happened to Ma. Angelica Grace in Cabahug wharf. In maritime databases these are simply called “capsizing”. They contrast it when ships lose buoyancy while sailing which they call “capsizing and sinking”.

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Photo Credit: James Gabriel Verallo

The most terrible and most straightforward sinking is when ships are caught in storms and sink. Maritime database call these “foundering” and that means more than enough water filled the ship making it lose buoyancy. There could be many causes of that. One is the pumps simply failed for several possible reasons and that is a possibility in smaller ships in stormy seas. The motor might have died in a storm and so the ship cannot maneuver and list. Foundering is the most terrible fate of a ship like the hull breaking in half (but this is rare and there is no local case like this here in recent memory) as casualties in a ship that failed to beat the storm is terrifying (remember Princess of the Stars). Holes in the hull might even afford a ship enough time to seek the coast and beach the ship like what happened to Wilcon IX. If the ship was beached, maritime databases call it “beached” and such an act avert loss of lives.

If it is a collision and the hull was breached, maritime databases are specific. They indicate “collision” or “collision and sinking” if that was the case. It might even be “collision and beached”. Collision and sinking was the case of St. Thomas Aquinas and that sank not because she was old (she was 39 years old when she sank). Cebu City was rammed too and sank and she was only 22 years old then. Her sister ship Don Juan was only 9 years old when she sank after a collision. Dona Paz was 24 years old when she was rammed then burned and sank. Collision and sinking are usually navigation errors which means human errors and the age of the ships is not a factor. The ramming hull of the other ship won’t ask first if the hull it is ramming is old or young or what is the age.

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Photo Credit: Philippine Air Force and Jethro Cagasan

When a ship catches fire, hull losses are sometime inevitable. It will not be certain if the cause of that is age and sometimes that does not in outright sinking because the ship can still head for the nearest land and beach itself like what Don Sulpicio did. SuperFerry 6 when it caught fire did not sink and was towed to Batangas. SuperFerry 14′s fire was not contained early too but she was towed and just keeled over when she was already in shallow waters and the fire out. Some caught fire in shipyards or in the docks and some of them were SuperFerry 3, SuperFerry 7, Philippine Princess, Iloilo Princess, St. Francis of Assisi, Manila City, Cagayan de Oro City and Asia Thailand. Again, it cannot be assumed that happened because of old age as some burned due to the sparks of welding. None of that four were over 35 years of age when they were destroyed by fire. Some others assume more morbid intentions that can’t be proved anyway.

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Photo Credit: Britz Salih

Ferry sinking is not common on short-distance ferries maybe because its routes are short and their transit times are not long. The only exception to this is Besta Shipping Lines which lost half of its fleet (four out of eight) to accidents. However, only their Baleno Nine sank outright. Baleno Six was wrecked by a typhoon (that wrecked other ships too like the Sta. Penafrancia 7), Baleno Tres grounded in rocks and was wrecked (a clear case of human error) and Baleno 168 capsized near the port because of water ingress due to a broken propeller shaft but she did not sink (and maybe this was because of old age; but then it is also possibly because of its propellers repeated hitting bottom in the shallow San Jose, Occidental Mindoro port when she was with her previous shipping).

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Photo Credit: Mike Anthony Arceno

In the past, I remembered two shipping companies notorious for being dirty and rusty. The Viva Shipping Lines combine had some 36 ships two decades ago and some of those were wooden-hulled. Only two of those sank, the Viva Penafrancia 2 which hit the wharf or a fish corral and was holed (which is navigation error and not old age) and the San Miguel Ilijan which was hulked by fire but did not sink. The feared owner of the shipping company had supposedly told his ship captains he will bury them if their ship sink and his reputation is good enough it will be believed. Well, those two ships did not sink outright and maybe the captains’ lives were spared.

In more recent years it was the Maharlika ships which was notorious for being dirty and rusty (but not as rusty as Viva). Yet for many years their ships do not sink even though it can’t sail because both engines failed or the ramp fell off. Maharlika Dos only sank because after four hours of wallowing dead in the water and with Maharlika Cuatro failing to come to the rescue she finally capsized and sank. It was a disservice to the original Maharlika ships which were fielded brand-new. However, the government is notorious for not taking care well of things and that continued under Christopher Pastrana who is infamous for making still relatively new ships look old and worn like the Maharlika Uno, Maharlika Dos, Maharlika Tres and Maharlika Cuatro. He also made the Grandstar ROROs look aged fast. And he will wail against the old ships (with crossed fingers) to promote his FastCats. What gall!

However the ship loss percentage of the two companies is low. As I have said before, the looks and lack of maintenance of the ships is not an automatic ticket to the bottom of the sea and Maharlika is the clear proof of that. And to think their ships are in the more notorious waters of the Philippines. Seamanship is actually probably more important. In Lucio Lim’s version (he of Lite Ferries Ferries), it is manning that is most important.

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Photo Credit: Mike Baylon

Overnight ships are also not wont to sink if one looks at their record. Uh, maybe not Trans-Asia Shipping Lines Inc. which has lost 4 ferries, the first Asia Singapore (capsized and sank), the Asia Thailand (hulked by fire while not sailing), the Asia South Korea (grounded, capsized and sank but they claimed terrorist action) and the Asia Malaysia (holed and sank). But over-all, not many overnight ferries were lost in the previous decades. It is actually liners which are more prone to sink and it is funny because these are our biggest ferries and many of them carry international certifications. Many will bet that Sulpicio Lines leads in this infamous category. Well, not too fast because their rate of sinking is just about the same as William, Gothong & Aboitiz (WG&A) and Aboitiz Transport System (ATS). In a comparative period from 1996 to 2007 before the incident that forced out Sulpicio Lines from passenger shipping, WG&A lost SuperFerry 3 (fire in shipyard), SuperFerry 6 (fire while sailing) and SuperFerry 7 (fire while docked in North Harbor). And they had serious grounding incidents. Dona Virginia quit sailing after a grounding incident off Siquijor and Our Lady of Banneux also quit sailing after a grounding in Canigao Channel.

In the same period Sulpicio Lines lost the Philippine Princess (fire while refitting), Princess of the Orient (foundered in a storm), Princess of the Pacific (grounding leading to wrecking) and Princess of the World (fire while sailing, did not sink). Pro rata, the two biggest shipping companies were even in hull loss (my preferred term) rate until 2007. But with the so-infamous wrecking of Princess of the Stars in a storm, pro rata Sulpicio Lines exceeded WG&A/ATS in maritime hull losses. Then later for a much-reduced liner fleet losing St. Thomas Aquinas (collision and sinking) and St. Gregory The Great (grounding leading to BER) is also a high percentage for 2GO. Few in these cases of liners lost can be attributed to the age of the ships.one-way-bike-club

Photo Credit: ONE WAY BIKE CLUB

It is actually our wooden-hulled motor boats or batel which might have the second highest rate of sinking. And maybe that is the reason why MARINA is pressuring San Nicholas Shipping Lines to retire their batel fleet and convert to steel-hulled ships. But the Moro boats are not well-known for that. Bar none, it is actually the passenger motor bancas which have the highest loss rate. Every year a passenger motor banca will be lost to storms especially in the Surigao area. But this is due to rough waters and not to old age.

So, why cull ships after 35 years of age when it is still seaworthy? The examples of maritime hull losses I mentioned shows it was not old age which made them sink. I have a database of over 300 Philippine maritime hull losses dating back to the end of World War II (while the government authorities can barely list 50). The list of mine does not include motor bancas and fishing vessels. It will be more if that is included. I can show it is not old age which was the primary factor in the sinking of the 300+.

All sinking are investigated by the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). But after some time maybe they donate the investigation papers to the termites or throw them away to Pasig River. That is why they can’t complete the list and argue against abogados like Maria Elena Bautista or Arthur Tugade when they are the true mariners. Talo talaga ng abogado ang marino kahit pa commodore o admiral at kahit maritime issues pa ang pinag-uusapan.

If the Supreme Court will be asked, their definition of seaworthiness is simply the ships having relevant certificates. To them it does not matter if the ship gets holed in deep seas while sailing. This is the gist of their most recent decision on a cargo ship of Aboitiz Shipping Corporation that sank in the late 1970’s. See how idiotic? The dumbies want to rewrite maritime concepts, that’s why.

If I will be asked maybe the culling of Tugade which should be raised first. The reason is old age.

It is in the Philippines where I noticed that the decision-makers are often those who don’t know a thing about the issues they are deciding on.

Experts do not matter in this land.

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Photo Credit: Lindsay Bridge

Some Unfortunate Flagships and Famous Former Flagships (Part 1)

If people think flagships or famous former flagships fare better than the rest of their fleet, well, don’t be too fast in conclusions. Empirical evidence might not support that and these tales might make you wonder and think. This selection is limited to post-World War II ferries. This is also limited to liner shipping companies and the bigger regional shipping companies. For the latter, I limited it to flagships at the moment they were lost.

The TSS Mayon

The Mayon was the flagship of the recomposed fleet of the Manila Steamship Company Inc. after World War II. She was the second ship acquired by the company after World War II (she is a different ship from the prewar Mayon of Manila Steamship Co.). The first was not really acquired but returned. That was the Anakan which was a prewar ship of the company that fell into Japanese hands during World War II and pressed into the military effort on their side. It was fortunate to survive the Allied campaign against Japanese shipping during the war. When the war ended and Japanese ships were surrendered she was returned by the Allies to the company in 1945.

The Mayon was built as the Carabobo in 1923 by the New York Shipbuilding in Camden, New Jersey, USA for the Atlantic and Caribbean Shipping and Navigation of Delaware, USA. In 1938, she was sold to the Northland Transportation Company of Alaska, USA. In 1946, Manila Steamship Co. which was also known as the Elizalde y Compania acquired this ship and she was fielded in the Manila-Iloilo-Pulupandan route of the company. Originally classified as a refrigerated passenger/cargo ship, she had luxurious accommodation because that meant airconditioning and cold drinks were available and those treats were rare in that era. With cabins and lounges, she was considered a luxury liner of her days.

However, on a charter voyage from Jakarta to Manila on February 18, 1955, an explosion and fire hit her and she was beached off the western coast of Borneo island. This incident so shook up Manila Steamship Co. that they withdrew from shipping the same year and they sold all their vessels to other companies except for the very old Bisayas, the former Kvichak which was sold to the breakers. Most of the these sold ships were former “FS” ships. Manila Steamship Co. never went back again to shipping. Elizalde y Compania was one of the biggest companies in the Philippines then and its founder Manuel Elizalde Sr. was one of the richest men in the Philippines during that time and he was known as a financial backer of presidential candidates.

The MV Dona Conchita

This was the first Dona Conchita that was the first flagship of Carlos A. Go Thong & Co. when they were first able to acquire a Manila route after they bought out the Pan-Oriental Shipping Company of the Quisumbing family. The ship was named after the wife of the founder of the company and this was a legendary ship during her time.

The ship was actually not an ex-”FS” ship as many thought. She is actually a former “F” ship that was lengthened by National Steel and Shipbuilding Corporation (NASSCO) in Mariveles, Bataan. Her origin was actually as a sank ship by a storm off Cavite that was bought cheap and salvaged by Carlos A. Go Thong & Co. and re-engined for she had no engines. Her replacement engines were a pair of Gray Marine diesels with nearly double the horsepower of the ex-”FS” ships and so instead of running at only 11 knots she was capable of 16 knots and thus she was able to claim as being the fastest in the Manila-Cebu route then.

This ship then did various routes for the Carlos A. Go Thong & Co. but always her first port of call from Manila was Cebu before proceeding to other ports. During those years there were no dedicated Manila-Cebu ships only (that came during the era of the fast cruisers starting in 1970 with the Sweet Faith of Sweet Lines). Because of that once, a week sailing was the norm then except for the very long routes (i.e. Davao) and the very short routes (i.e. Capiz, Mindoro, Romblon).

When the Dona Conchita got older sometimes she was not sailing. I heard her Gray Marine engines were not that durable compared to the General Motors engines of the ex-”FS” ships. Then on one of her voyages, she caught fire off Mindoro sometime in 1976 or thereabouts. There was no precise way of confirming the dates or exact location as she does not have an IMO Number and therefore she was not in the international maritime databases.

The M/S Don Juan

In 1971, Negros Navigation Company brought out their best  and biggest liner yet, the M/ S Don Juan. The ship was named in honor of Don Juan L. Ledesma, eldest child of Don Julio and Dona Florentina Ledesma, one of the founders of Negros Navigation. M/S Don Juan was a brand-new ship built by Niigata Engineering Company, Ltd. in Niigata, Japan for P13,650,000 from a design of Filipino naval architects. She was the fifth-built brand-new liner of Negros Navigation Company after the Princess of Negros (1962), the Dona Florentina (1965), the beautiful Don Julio (1967) and Don Vicente (1969). This luxury liner became the new flagship of Negros Navigation Company and she was used in the Iloilo and Bacolod routes of the company from Manila. She was fast at 19 knots and she brought an end to the reign of MV Galaxy as the speediest ship in the Manila-Iloilo route.

However, on one voyage from Manila to Bacolod she was struck on the portside by the tanker Tacloban City of the Philippine National Oil Company on the night of April 22, 1980 near the island of Maestre de Campo in Tablas Strait. Such collision proved fatal for the ship and she listed immediately and went down fast. The confirmed number of dead was 121 even though the tanker immediately tried to rescue the passengers of M/S Don Juan and even as other vessels in the vicinity tried to help in the rescue effort too. It is thought many of the dead were passengers of the cabins trapped by buckled doors and those injured by the impact. This incident triggered a mourning in Bacolod as most of the passengers who perished hailed from that place.

The wreck of the ship lies in deep waters estimated to be some 550 meters and so salvage and/or recovery is out of question as far as local resources is concerned. Maybe the RORO ferry Santa Maria, acquired by Negros Navigation Company in 1980 was the replacement of the ill-fated M/S Don Juan. But I am not sure if she was considered a flagship of the company.

The MV Cebu City

The MV Cebu City of William Lines Incorporated was a sister ship of the M/S Don Juan of Negros Navigation Company. She was also built by Niigata Engineering Company Ltd. in Niigata, Japan but her date of build (DOB) was 1972. Having a slightly bigger engine she was slightly faster than her sister since she can do 20 knots. Maybe they purposely ordered a bigger engine so she can battle in speed her would-be main rival, the Sweet Faith of Sweet Lines Incorporated in the prime Manila-Cebu route. Sweet Faith was the fastest liner then in the Philippines since her fielding in 1970. The battles of Cebu City and Sweet Faith both made them legends in Philippine shipping and remembered decades after they duked it out.

MV Cebu City was the second brand-new ship of William Lines Inc. after the MV Misamis Occidental and she was the flagship of William Lines Inc. from 1972. As the flagship, MV Cebu City exclusively did the Manila-Cebu route twice a week and so followed the pattern set by Sweet Faith. She was the flagship of the company up to the end of 1979 when the new flagship of the company arrived, the equally legendary Dona Virginia which was also involved in another tight battle with another flagship, the Philippine Princess of Sulpicio Lines Inc. After she was displaced as the flagship MV Cebu City sailed various routes for the company.

On the night before the morning of December 2, 1994, while hurrying after a late departure from Manila North Harbor, MV Cebu City encountered the MV Kota Suria, a container ship of Pacific International Lines (PIL) near the mouth of Manila Bay before reaching Corregidor island. On a collision course, the Kota Suria asked for the customary port-to-port evasion maneuver. However, MV Cebu City turned to port because maybe she was intending to “tuck in” near the coast, a practice of smaller ships when near then Cavite coast to save on running time. Maybe MV Cebu City thought she had enough clearance but they might have misjudged the speed of the MV Kota Suria. She was rammed by the much bigger MV Kota Suria on the starboard side which caused her to list and to capsize and sink in a short time.

About 145 people lost their lives in that collision. The Philippine Coast Guard later held that MV Cebu City was mainly at fault but Philippine authorities also detained MV Kota Suria (but she later escaped). The wreck of MV Cebu City now lies under about 25 meters of water.

The Dona Paz

The world-infamous Dona Paz was born as the Himeyuri Maru of the Ryukyu Kaiun KK (the RKK Line). She was built by Onomichi Zosen in Onomichi yard in Japan in 1963 and she plied the Okinawa route. In 1975, she was sold to Sulpicio Lines Incorporated. She was refitted and remodelled for Philippine use with the primary intention of increasing her passenger capacity. In Sulpicio Lines, she was renamed as the Don Sulpicio and she was the new flagship of the company starting in 1975.

As the flagship of Sulpicio Lines, Don Sulpicio did the Manila-Cebu route exclusively twice a week. This was the first time Sulpicio Lines did this exclusive assignment and that was following the footsteps of Sweet Lines and William Lines which had flagships doing the Manila-Cebu exclusively. On one voyage in this route on June 7, 1979, she caught fire and she was beached in Maricaban island at the edge of the mouth of Batangas Bay. Her whole superstructure and cargo holds were consumed by the fire.

Against expectation Sulpicio Lines had her repaired but the repairs took nearly two years. Meanwhile the Dona Ana, the later Dona Marilyn took over as flagship of the company and did the Manila-Cebu route until the new flagship of Sulpicio Lines arrived, the Philippine Princess. After repairs, in her refielding in 1981, Don Sulpicio was already known as the Dona Paz. Maybe the renaming was done to avoid reference to her previous tragedy. There were also changes in her superstructure after the repair.

After her refielding, the Dona Paz was assigned to the Manila-Tacloban and Manila-Catbalogan-Tacloban routes of Sulpicio Lines. However, on one voyage from Tacloban and Catbalogan she was involved in a collision with the tanker Vector on the night of December 20, 1987. The fuel of the tanker exploded and both vessels were engulfed in fire. There were only 26 survivors in the collision and there was a claimed 4,386 dead and that was affirmed by the clueless and out-of-jurisdiction Supreme Court. That was big enough to place the Dona Paz as the worst peacetime maritime tragedy in the whole world. However, the official casualty according to the Board of Marine Inquiry placed the number of dead at only 1,565 but that was what can be only counted and might be an underestimation too.

The casualty figure was clearly bloated because the Governor of Northern Samar then, Raul Daza had people sign up claims against the company and the number from his province was about 2,200. That was an impossibility since passengers from that province going to Manila generally take the bus already and that was cheaper and faster. Going to Catbalogan is actually going farther and the limited number of buses then going from Catarman to Catbalogan can only take hundreds at most. It was clearly a con game by the Governor in a scheme to bilk Sulpicio Lines. Imagine a passenger total greater than those from Leyte and Western Samar when the ship did not dock in Northern Samar! The ship was clearly overloaded but the casualty figure was really artificially bloated.

Much later the Supreme Court completely absolved Sulpicio Lines from liability in the tragedy. It was on a technicality because Vector had an expired license when it sailed. The Dona Paz wreck lies between Marinduque and Dumali Point of Mindoro near the town of Pola. The distance of it from Marinduque is twice its distance from Mindoro.

The Dona Marilyn

The Dona Marilyn was the first known as the Dona Ana in Sulpicio Lines Incorporated and she is actually a sister ship of Dona Paz. She arrived in 1976 for Sulpicio Lines and they were the first fast luxury cruiser liners of the company and so they were advertised by Sulpicio Lines as the “Big Two”. As mentioned before, as Dona Ana she replaced the then Don Sulpicio as the flagship when it caught fire in 1979 and she fulfilled that role until the Philippine Princess arrived in 1981.

The Dona Marilyn was born as the Otohime Maru in Japan. She was also built by Onomichi Zosen for Ryukyu Kaiun KK (the RKK Line) in 1966 for the Okinawa route. When she was sold to Sulpicio Lines in 1976 there was no change of flagship designation although she is the newer  and ship. She was instead fielded in the Manila-Cebu-Davao express route of the company. Maybe she was sent to that more stressful (for the engines) route because she had the newer engines. Incidentally, the engines of the two sister ships were identical but Dona Ana was rated faster than Don Sulpicio and that might be the second reason why she was assigned the long Davao route.

In 1980, the ship was renamed as the Dona Marilyn. In 1981 when the new Philippine Princess arrived she was assigned not assigned again her old Davao route because Sulpicio Lines had two new fast cruisers that came in 1978 and one of that, the Don Enrique (the future Davao Princess and Iloilo Princess) was already holding that route. She was then assigned to the new Manila-Estancia-Iloilo-Zamboanga-Cotabato route of the company.

In 1988, the new Cotabato Princess arrived and she was relieved from that route and she was assigned the route vacated by the loss of the Dona Paz, the Manila-Catbalogan-Tacloban route and Manila-Tacloban route. On October 23, 1988 while there was a typhoon brewing, the Typhoon “Unsang”, Dona Marilyn tried to hightail it to Tacloban when the storm was already off the coast of Samar island on the way to Bicol. “Unsang” was a fast-gaining storm in strength and the ship being new in that area maybe did not know how fast the seas there can become vicious in so short a time (even squalls there can be dangerous for smaller crafts). The ship was swamped by the seas that gained strength from Signal No. 2 to Signal No. 3 and she listed and capsized some 5 nautical miles off Almagro island which is part of Western Samar. Only 147 people managed to survive the tragedy and some 389 people perished.

[There is a coming Part 2]

[Photo credit of MV Don Sulpicio: Times Journal and Gorio Belen]